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I. INTRODUCTION
Although each day nursing facilities care for approximately 1.5 million
vulnerable elderly individuals, the nursing facility industry is bedeviled by an
abysmal public image. To explain this poor public image, resident advocates point
to the industry's substandard performance over the years, but the industry sees itself
as a scapegoat. The divergence between these two views-with nursing facilities
* Director of the Nursing Home Advocacy Project of Bet Tzedek Legal Services, Los Angeles,
California; B.A., 1982, Univ. of Minnesota; J.D., 1988, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at
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as either victimizers or victims-has led to schizophrenic public policy. The
relationship between government and nursing facilities is based nominally on an
"enforcement-first" structure but, as a practical matter, loopholes within the
enforcement system have crippled enforcement for all but the most egregious and
longstanding facility violations. Meanwhile, nursing facility representatives are
attempting, on numerous fronts and through a variety of stratagems, to divert
governmental agencies further away from enforcement and towards a less
adversarial, more consultative role.
II. BAD PRESS AND BAD FEELINGS: NURSING FACILITIES
AS SOCIETAL PARIAHS
Nursing facilities' occupy a truly unique place in American society and in the
American psyche. But "unique," in this context, is hardly a compliment.
Despite the fact that each day nursing facilities provide life-sustaining nursing
care for approximately 1.5 million vulnerable residents2 -more personally, for
ourselves, our spouses, and our parents-the public image of nursing facilities is
hardly benevolent. Like the haunted mansion in a "B" movie, the nursing facility
is foreboding and a bit mysterious; although one occasionally notices the nursing
facilities around town, she has no desire to enter-until an illness to her or a family
member leaves no alternative.
The "unique" status of nursing facilities results from facilities being alternately
ignored and reviled. The few newspaper stories concerning nursing facilities
generally convey disturbing images: a female resident being raped by a young,
mentally-ill resident,3 an Arizona resident burning to death after being left in the
sun for seven hours,4 a resident dying soon after being found in a bed covered with
ants,5 a California resident having her arm pulled out of its socket by nurses,6 or a
Michigan resident strangling to death, caught between her mattress and bed rails.7
Even less drastic events are given a similarly nightmarish presentation.
Representative of such presentation is this lead paragraph from a LosAngeles Times
article, concerning a report on California nursing facilities issued by the General
1. Consistent with federal law, this article uses the term "nursing facility" to denominate those facilities
that in the vernacular are commonly referred to as "nursing homes" or "convalescent hospitals." See 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1395i-3(a), 1396r(a) (West Supp. 1999) (definitions); 42 C.F.R. § 483.5 (West 2000) (same).
2. AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, FACTS AND TRENDS: THE NURSING FACILITY SOURCEBOOK
1999, at 11.
3. Michael J. Berens, DangerousBedfellows Series: Warehousing the Mentally Ill in Nursing Homes, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 27, 1998, at 1.
4. Christina Leonard, Sunburn Death Prompts Nursing Home Inquiry, ARz. REPUB., June 10, 1999, at
Al.
5. Nursing Home Sued in Death of Patient by Ant Swarm, WASH. POST, Nov. 8,1998, at A16.
6. Robert Salladay, Lawmakers Move to Beefup Nursing Home Laws, S.F. EXAMINER, May 30, 1999,
atAl.
7. B.G. Gregg, State Lawmakers Urge Nursing Home Reforms, DET. NEWS, May 12, 1999, at Cl.
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Accounting Office: "The halls reek of urine. Old people lie helpless in their beds
hour after hour, soiled diapers unchanged."8 In a similar vein, television news-
magazines often use black-and-white footage from hidden cameras to portray
nursing facilities as medical holding pens.
Behind the horror stories is the perception that nursing facility operators are
disreputable in some way. For example, when the casino owned by the greedy and
malicious Mr. Bums is closed on an episode of television's The Simpsons, his
casino employees---"cardsharps, bottom dealers and shills"--are transferred into
managerial positions in his nursing facility chain.9
III. VICTMIZERS OR VICTIMs?
What can explain the antipathy and contempt that the news media and popular
culture have for an institution that cares for sick, elderly individuals? This
question's two divergent answers-each answer 180 degrees from the other-lead
to two entirely different philosophies for the repair of a care delivery system that,
by all accounts, is broken.
From the point of view held generally by resident advocates 0 and governmental
agencies," nursing facilities have earned their societal opprobrium by providing a
consistently abysmal quality of care. 2 The necessary response? In the vernacular,
"throw the book" at the many substandard facilities. More precisely, legal
requirements must be refined, and enforcement of the law must be strengthened.'
3
8. Robert A. Rosenblatt & Julie Marquis, GAO Assails Nursing Home Care in State, L.A. TIMES, July 26
1998, at Al. But see Elderly Suffer Quiet Personal Agonies of Neglect, BOSTON HERALD, June 13, 1999,
(discussing the routine problems in nursing facilities).
9. Mr. Bums: I'm just thinking of my employees. All the cardsharps, bottom dealers and shills.
Where will they go?
Mr. Smithers: They're managing your chain of nursing homes, sir.
Mr. Bums: Excellent!
The Sinpsons: Viva Ned Flanders (Fox television broadcast, Jan. 10, 1999).
10. For the purposes of this article, resident advocates are individuals who work on a paid or unpaid basis
to uphold the rights of the residents of long-term care facilities. Many resident advocates and advocacy
organizations belong to the National Citizen's Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, located in Washington D.C.
11. Federal and state agencies are responsible for surveying nursing facilities, and for enforcing the
relevant law against these facilities. See, e.g., ERIC M. CARLSON, LONG-TERM CARE ADVOCACY § 2.26 (1999)
(discussing enforcement of federal nursing facility law by the federal Health Care Financing Administration and
state survey agencies).
12. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998) (substandard care in California nursing
facilities); COMMITTEE ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
CARE IN NURSING HOMES 3 (1986)[hereinafter IOM REPORT](detailing the history of poor care provided by
nursing facilities); BRUCE VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOMETRAGEDY 4-5 (1980) (same).
13. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, GAOIHEHS-99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS
NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999) (need for stricter
enforcement); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/IHEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSISTDESPITEFEDERALANDSTATEOVERSIGHT (1998) (same);IOM REPORT, supra note 12. at 104-
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Nursing facilities, 4 and especially their trade associations, 5 have an entirely
different perspective, as if facility representatives and resident advocates lived on
two separate planets. Facility representatives see themselves as scapegoats for
families and a society that have turned their backs on sick elders. 16 The facilities are
victims, not victimizers, and feel aggrieved with an intensity that is no less than that
held by those who advocate on behalf of injured residents.
Specifically, from the facilities' point of view, the "facility as a victim!' is
subjected to an intense and punitive level of regulation. For example, in response
to a scathing General Accounting Office report finding that thirty percent of
California nursing facilities had caused death or serious physical harm to
residents,17 facility representatives claimed in an editorial that "California's nursing
home industry is one of the most highly regulated, and its enforcement system is
probably the most effective in the country." 18 More generally, various facility
representatives regularly claim-without attribution-that the nursing facility
industry is second in regulatory oversight only to the nuclear power industry.19
IV. THE CURRENT FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
In 1983, Congress commissioned the Institute of Medicine to study the
condition of the nation's nursing facilities, and to recommend improvements to the
federal regulatory system.20 The resultant report, entitled Improving the Quality of
Care in Nursing Homes, 21 was published in 1986, and led to the enactment of the
federal Nursing Home Reform Law, part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987.22
170,203-212.
14. See supra, note 1 (defining nursing facilities for the purposes of this article).
15. Nursing facility trade associations lobby legislators and governmental agencies on behalf of their
member facilities. Hereinafter this article uses the term "facility representatives" to refer jointly to nursing
facilities and nursing facility trade associations.
16. See, e.g., Richard Wolfe & Jonathon E. Cohn, Keeping Nursing Homes Healthy: The Elder-Care
Problem Won't Be Solved By Politics and More Rhetoric, L.A. DAILY J., August 19, 1998 (alleging that "[m]any
of the complaints that are made [against facilities] have more to do with addressing the guilty conscience of a child
or other loved one than with a bona fide care issue"); John O'Connor, Use Dollars and Sense to Fix Facilities,
MCKNIGHT's LONG-TERM CARE NEws, Sept. 1998, at 89 (explaining that poor care is a result of allegedly
inadequate Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates); Rosenblatt & Marquis, supra note 8, at Al (reporting
that nursing facility representatives dismiss GAO report as "political scapegoating").
17. See GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFIcE, GAO/HEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT, 9 (1998).
18. Wolfe & Cohn, supra note 16.
19. The author has read and heard this claim numerous times, most recently on August 27, 1999 by former
nursing facility administrator Abraham Lutfi, during an AARP forum in Baldwin Park, California.
20. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note 12, at 248.
21. Id.
22. See 56 Fed. Reg. 48826 (1991) (Institute of Medicine report the genesis of the Nursing Home Reform
Law). The Nursing Home Reform Law is described more accurately (but more cumbersomely) as the 1987
Nursing Facility Amendments to the Medicare and Medicaid Acts. The Nursing Home Reform Law is codified
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Consistent with the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine, the Nursing
Home Reform Law focuses on the issue of whether residents receive adequate
individualized care. The standard is set high: under the Reform Law and
accompanying regulations, each resident must receive the care that she needs to
"attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-
being."23 Furthermore, this standard applies to virtually every aspect of care that
might be needed by a nursing facility resident:24 for example, rehabilitation
services,' activity programs,26 and the prevention and treatment of bed sores.27
The government versus industry battles during the 1990's have largely been
fought over the enforcement of the Nursing Home Reform Law. Furthermore, due
to the political power of the nursing facility trade associations, the industry has won
the majority of the significant battles, saddling enforcement agencies with a
loophole-ridden system.
The weakness of the current enforcement system raises queasy feelings of ddja
vu for any resident advocate. In its 1986 report, the Institute of Medicine criticized
the lenient nature of the then-existing enforcement system.2 The Institute noted that
"[flederal procedures for dealing with facilities found to be out of compliance
[were] oriented toward helping facilities to improve rather than enforcing the
certification standards."29 Facilities generally were "not punished for violations
directly, but rather for failing to carry out an administrative order to correct
violations by a certain date., 30 As a result, too many facilities remained out of
compliance for months or years, coming into compliance sporadically, only when
necessary to renew eligibility for continued Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement.
3 1
Unfortunately, the current enforcement system resembles in many ways the
system criticized by the Institute of Medicine in the 1980's. This is due primarily
to the pressure imposed on the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) by
the nursing facility trade associations. This pressure has caused HCFA to insert
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3 (West Supp. 1999) (applicable to any resident of a nursing facility certified to accept
Medicare reimbursement) and 42 U.S.CA, § 1396r (West Supp. 1999) (applicable to any resident of a nursing
facility certified to accept Medicaid reimbursement). Sections 1395i-3 and 1396r are virtual mirror images of each
other.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), 1396r(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999); 42 CF.R. § 483.25 (West 2000).
24. See, e.g., CARL.SON, supra note 11, §§ 2.02, 2.07- 2.21 (1999) (providing the required level of nursing
facility services under federal law).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i.3(b)(4XA)(i), 1396r(b)(4)(A)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 483.45(a).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4)(A)(v), 1396r(b)(4)(A)(v); 42 C,F.R. § 483.15(0(1).
27. 42 C.FR. § 483.25(c).
28. IOM REPORT, supra note 12. at 147-148.
29. Id. at 147.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 147.
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significant loopholes in the enforcement procedures set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations and the HCFA State Operations Manual.32
For example, a government survey agency generally does not assess a remedy
for a violation unless the offending nursing facility first has had an opportunity to
correct the violation by a date set by the agency.33 This grace period-eerily
reminiscent of practices condemned by the Institute of Medicine-is mentioned
nowhere in either statute or regulation, and represents a significant give-away by
HCFA during the drafting of the State Operations Manual. 3
In practice the opportunity to correct violations often means that a remedy
cannot be assessed. This occurs for at least two reasons. First, many and possibly
most violations are one-time occurrences that cannot truly be "corrected." If, for
example, a resident develops a bedsore after his skin condition is not monitored
properly, neither the improper conduct nor the injury can be reversed. What passes
for "correction" in such an instance is the submission by the facility of a "plan of
correction," which in practice is little more than the facility's written promise that
it will not commit a similar violation in the future.
35
Second, many survey agencies do not have enough personnel to verify that a
correction has or has not taken place. Indeed, pursuant to a 1995 HCFA
Memorandum, survey agencies for the time being are not required to verify a
facility's claimed correction if the violation's severity has been classified as no
greater than "no actual harm with potential for more than minimal harm that is not
immediate jeopardy.' 36 As a result, a remedy is unlikely to be assessed whenever
a facility claims that "correction" has occurred by the "date certain."
32. See Toby S. Edelman, What Happened to Enforcement?, in NURSING HOME LAW LETrER (National
Senior Citizens Law Center), Feb. 13, 1998, at 42-45 [hereinafter NSCLC LErrER]; CARLSON, supra note 11, §§
2.2612], [3].
33. HCFA STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL §§ 7304(A),(B), 7313(B) (1999) [hereinafter HCFA MANUAL].
34. See NSCLC LETTER, supra note 32, at 20.
35. Actually, the HCFA Manual requires that a "plan of correction" explain how the particular resident's
condition will be corrected, how the facility will identify other at-risk residents, what systemic changes will occur,
and how the facility will monitor corrective actions. HCFA MANUAL, supra note 33, § 7304(C). These standards,
however, generally are not followed in practice. Most plans of correction explain that the facility will act
appropriately in the future, and then list the facility employee who supposedly will monitor the situation. For
example, in the bed sore scenario sketched in the text, the plan of correction might state that all residents in the
future will receive adequate attention to their skin condition, and that the director of nursing will be responsible
for monitoring the facility's performance.
36. Memorandum from HCFA Deputy Bureau Director for Survey and Certification to Regional
Administrators and State Agency Directors, Interim Revisit Policy (Dec. 6,1995) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); HCFA MANUAL, supra note 33, § 7400(E)(1). The HCFA Memorandum states that revisits are not
required for violations classified in "Boxes D, E or F'; section 7400(E)(I) explains that those boxes correspond
to violations classified as "no actual harm with potential for more than minimal harm that'is not immediate
jeopardy."
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The General Accounting Office (GAO) addressed the grace period issue, along
with other issues, in a 1998 report focusing on California nursing facilities.37 The
GAO report noted that facilities were given grace periods almost universally, with
only two narrow exceptions. First, grace periods were not allowed in situations in
which a violation had placed a resident's health or safety in "immediate jeopardy.,
38
Second, grace periods also were not allowed if the facility had been classified as a
"poor performer," 39 which at that time was defined as a facility "with a history of
going in and out of compliance and/or a facility that has no system in place to
monitor its own compliance."
In response to the GAO report,41 President Clinton announced that survey
agencies henceforth would be instructed to "[e]nsure that nursing homes are in
compliance with standards before lifting sanctions.' 42 President Clinton also
authorized HCFA to "direct enforcement authorities to impose civil monetary
penalties immediately upon finding that a nursing home has committed a serious
or chronic violation. ' 43 The President noted that, prior to these changes,
"enforcement officials often [had] give[n] nursing homes numerous opportunities
to come into compliance, rather than imposing immediate sanctions."
'
Despite these presidential orders, a survey agency rarely assesses a remedy
without first granting the facility a grace period. First, although HCFA promulgated
regulations authorizing assessment of a civil monetary penalty for only one
violation,45 the validity of these regulations is in doubt.46
Second, in regard to the other remedies used by survey agencies, a remedy
generally is not imposed until a facility is given an opportunity to "correct" the
violation. The opportunity to correct is unavailable only if the facility's violation
37. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, GAO/HEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998).
38. HCFA MANUAL, supra note 33, § 7313.
39. Id. § 7304(B).
40. Id.
41. Actually, the President's announcement was made the week prior to the release of the GAO report, in
an effort to preempt criticism. See Robert Pear, Clinton Announces Drive to Cut Abuse At Nursing Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1998, at Al; Robert A. Rosenblatt, Clinton Seeks Improved Nursing Home Oversight, L.A.TIMES,
July 22, 1998, at A1; Rosenblatt & Marquis, supra note 8, at Al.




45. 64 Fed. Reg. 13354 (1999).
46. See Complaint, American Health Care Ass'n v. Shalala, No. 1:99 CVO 127 (D.D.C. May 18, 1999)
(visited Feb. 13,2000) <http.//www.ahca.orgIbrief/cmpcomplaint.htm>. The lawsuit alleged, among other things,
that the relevant provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts do not authorize the assessment of per-violation
monetary penalties, and the promulgation of the regulations did not comply with the notice and comment
requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act. The lawsuit was dismissed on March 7, 2000, for
AHCA's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the issues raised can be asserted as defenses by individual
nursing facilities.
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puts residents' health or safety in immediate jeopardy, or if for two consecutive
surveys the facility has committed a violation of a severity found to be either
"actual harm" or "immediate jeopardy."47 Although, in all other instances, the
survey agency possesses the discretion to allow or not allow an opportunity to
correct, most survey agencies continue to give facilities that opportunity.
48
For these reasons, the federal enforcement system has been unable to compel
substandard facilities to make real improvements. For example, among a sample of
seventy-four substandard facilities that supposedly had "corrected" sanctionable
violations, sixty-nine of those facilities committed subsequent violations. 49 Because
sanctions rarely were imposed, some facilities went through this "yo-yo pattern of
compliance and noncompliance" as many as six or seven times.50 In short, as
summarized by the GAO, "[t]he threat of sanctions appeared to have little effect on
deterring [facilities] from falling out of compliance again because [facilities] could
continue to avoid the sanctions' effect as long as they kept correcting their
deficiencies. ' '1
V. EFFORTS BY THE LONG-TERM CARE INDUSTRY TO REPLACE
OR TRANSFORM THE EXISTING ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Both resident advocates and facility representatives are wholly dissatisfied with
the enforcement status quo, but for reasons that are consistent with the disparate
perspectives discussed above. Resident advocates believe that the enforcement
systems at both the federal and state levels have been made impotent by procedural
roadblocks and a lack of resources.52 The solution at either level-state or
47. HCFA MANUAL, supra note 33, §§ 7304(A), 7313(B).
48. Id. § 7304.
49. GENERALAccOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46, NURSINGHOMES:ADDITIONALSTEPS NEEDEDTO
STRENGTIiEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, 13-14 (1999).
50. Id.
51. Id.at3.
52. See, e.g., supra notes 28-50 and accompanying text (explaining the federal enforcement procedure);
Michael Moss, Appeals Mire Collection ofNursing-Home Fines, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1999, at B1 (determining
that there are 670 actions backed up at appeals panel capable of issuing no more than two dozen decisions
annually); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46, NURSINO HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDEDTO
STRENGTHENENFORCEMENTOFFEDERALQUALITYSTANDARDS, at 15 (detailing a backlog of 700 cases at appeals
panel); Hard Data, McKNIGHT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Apr. 14, 1999, at 6 (explaining that the HCFA is
requiring additional $9.5 million to eliminate backlog at appeals panel); Providers: Enforcement Focus Can
Undermine Quality, McKNIGHT's LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Sept. 1998, at 16 [hereinafter McKnight Providers]
(Urban Institute researcher supporting stronger enforcement); CALIFORNIA ADVOCATES FOR NURSING HOME
REFORM. STATUS REPORT ON CALIFORNIA'S NURSING HOME INDUSTRY (1998) (detailing the inadequate
enforcement of California nursing facility law); PENNSYLVANIA AUDITOR GENERAL.THE OVERSIGHT OFNURSINO
HOMECAREIN PENNSYLVANIA: RESIDENTS INJEOPARDY (1998) (inadequate enforcement of Pennsylvania nursing
facility law); WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION: NURSING HOME REGULATION, Report
98-2 (1998) (inadequate enforcement of Wisconsin nursing facility law).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
federal-is a streamlining of enforcement processes and an increase in available
resources.
53
The arguments made by nursing facility representatives assume a dramatically
different reality: the problem is too much enforcement and not enough money. The
editor of one provider magazine states: "poor-performing facilities are largely the
result of flawed oversight and reimbursement systems."54 Similarly, the executive
vice president of the American Health Care Association stated that "[e]nforcement
activity alone is not the answer; in fact, a single-minded emphasis on enforcement
will ultimately hurt quality."55 From this point of view, monetary penalties simply
"take money out of the system that should be spent on patient care.'
'56
According to facility representatives, enforcement can diminish the quality of
care by focusing on matters essentially unrelated to resident's well-being. In the
words of a vice president of a nursing facility chain, "the survey system does not
measure quality.' 57 At best, enforcement activities are only beneficial in regards to
those few facilities characterized as "bad apples. 58
In general, facility representatives argue that the government should improve
care not by regulation and enforcement, but by increasing Medicaid and Medicare
rates, and providing "technical assistance" regarding the best ways to provide
nursing facility care.59 In general, facility representatives advocate a "partnership"
53. See, e.g., NSCLC LETTER, supra note 32, at 1, 46 (need for stronger enforcement of federal nursing
facility law); McKnight Providers, supra note 52, at 16 (Urban Institute researcher supporting stronger
enforcement); CALIFORNIA ADVOCATES FOR NURSING HOME REFORM, STATUS REPORT ON CALIFORNIA'S
NURSING HOME INDUSTRY (1998) (demonstrating the need for stronger enforcement of state nursing facility law);
PENNSYLVANIA AUDITOR GENERAL, THEOVERSIGir OFNURSING HOME CARE: RESIDENTS INJEOPARDY, ch. VI
(1998) (same); WISCONSINLEGISLATIVEAUDrrBUREAU, AN EVALUATION: NURSING HOMEREGULATION, Report
98-2 (1998) (same).
54. O'Connor, supra note 16, at 89 (emphasis added).
55. McKnight Providers, supra note 52, at 16; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 41, at A22 (reporting a
similar quote from the same individual).
56. Lisa Werner Carr, Providers Brace for Citation Frenzy As Crackdown Begins, MCKNIGHT'S LONG-
TERM CARE, Oct. 1998, at 14 (quoting the president of an Ohio trade association for non-profit nursing facilities);
see also CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH FACILITIES, HELP US HELP THEM, 5 (1999) [hereinafter CAHF
HELP] ("financial penalties alone merely drain resources from resident care").
57. Eugene B. Clarke, Quality or Compliance?, MCKNIGT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Nov. 1998, at 20;
see also CAHF HELP, supra note 56, at 5 (1999) ("[enforcement] system neither measures nor guarantees quality
care").
58. See McKnight Providers, supra note 52, at 16, 24; see, e.g., Clarke, supra note 57, at 20-21 (vice
president of Beverly Enterprises nursing facility chain arguing that "survey system does not measure quality");
Wolfe & Cohn, supra note 16 (editorial by facility representatives, acknowledging existence of "poor performers"
but arguing that improved enforcement is less important than increased funding and adjustment of licensure
categories).
59. See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 89; see, e.g., CAHF HELP, supra note 56 (brochure developed by
California trade association to support legislative advocacy; arguing that state survey agency should focus less
on enforcement and more on "quality measurements," "performance measures," and prevention); Wolfe & Cohn,
supra note 16 (editorial by facility representatives, supporting expansion of state "best practices" program).
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between facilities and government.6° For example, the executive vice president of
the American Health Care Association recommended that government agencies
"should work in cooperation with the industry and put the 'emphasis on the 90% of
the people who want to do a good job.' ,'6' A vice president of the California
Association of Health Care Facilities advocated for a relationship in which the
government survey agency would counsel poorly-performing facilities, and
encourage and support good facilities:
We need a system that targets enforcement efforts on facilities with
consistent problems and helps them improve the internal systems necessary
to ensure continuous quality. We need an enforcement system that supports
good providers and shares their successful programs with others, so that all
residents can benefit from their example.62
A spokesperson for a national nursing facility chain argued both that the survey
process is counterproductive and that government should act cooperatively:
Imposing additional fines will do nothing to evolve the system to where it
needs to be, which is a regulatory system that encourages good behavior
rather than continuing to come up with ways to beat up the industry....
We still are operating under a system that seeks and finds problems where
sometimes they don't even exist.63
A. Government as a Consultant
In various ways, nursing facility trade associations have tried to re-engineer the
enforcement system into a cooperative or consultative relationship with the relevant
government agency. In the most fully developed example of these efforts, the
American Health Care Association worked with the state of South Dakota to
develop "an alternative survey process for nursing facilities," which in December
1996 was submitted by South Dakota to the federal Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) for approval.6
60. McKnight Providers, supra note 52, at 16 (quote from American Health Care Association
spokesperson).
61. Rosenblatt, supra note 41, at A15.
62. Trecy A. Blankenheim, GAOReportfDetailsAbuses, Helps Fuel LTC Crackdown, McKNIoHT'sLONO-
TERM CARE NEws, Sept. 1998, at 26,27.
63. Fine Tuning, CoNTFMP. LONG TERM CARE. May 1999, at 12, 14 (statement of spokesperson for
Beverly Enterprises).
64. Letter from Joan Bachman, Administrator of the Office of Health Care Facilities Licensure and
Certification, South Dakota Dept. of Health, to Steven Clauser, Director of Health Care Financing
Administration's Office of Beneficiary Program Research and Demonstration (Apr. 14, 1997) (notes attached to
letter); see 62 Fed. Reg. 15187, 15190 (1997); AnT ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF PRIVATE ACCREDITATION OF
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The "South Dakota Quality Initiative" (SDQI) provided for replacement of the
existing enforcement system with "a new system for quality measurement and
improvement for nursing facilities."' 5 In general, regular surveying would be
replaced by a system in which specific surveyors would be assigned to perhaps ten
nursing facilities, and would work with those facilities' quality assurance teams on
a regular basis. The surveyors' evaluation of the facility would be based in large
part on quality indicator data and customer satisfaction surveys.67
Government representatives and resident advocacy groups raised numerous
objections to the SDQI. Most significantly, under the SDQI enforcement of existing
federal standards would disappear or at least diminish. Specifically, South Dakota
first proposed that a facility's quarterly Quality Assurance Report could replace
government-issued inspection reports. After objections were raised, South Dakota
agreed that deficiencies would be recorded on the same form. routinely used by
survey agencies, but simultaneously suggested that the statement of deficiencies
would be written jointly by the government surveyors and the facilities' quality
assurance teams.6
In any case, participation by government surveyors in a facility's quality
assurance activities could compromise any ongoing enforcement. First, a surveyor
understandably would find it difficult to cite a facility for which she essentially had
been working as a consultant. Second, time and resources dedicated to quality
assurance necessarily must limit the effort which government survey agencies can
devote to enforcement. 9
Ultimately, the HCFA refused to grant South Dakota the waiver necessary to
operate the SDQI.70 The HCFA explained that it would "not conduct any
demonstration or authorize any waiver of regulation which alters, in any way, the
survey, certification or enforcement process as described by both the [HCFA] State
NURSINGHOMES, REGULATORYINCENTIVESANDNON-REGULATORYINmATIVES, ANDEFFECTIVENESSOFSURVEY
AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEM § 13.6.4.1 (1998) [hereinafter ABT ASSOCIATES] (AHCA working with South
Dakota); Toby S. Edleman, HCFA Retreats From Regulatory Role, in NURSING HOME LAW LErrER (National
Senior Citizens Law Center), Nov. 7, 1997, at 5 (same).
65. 62 Fed. Reg. 15187, 15190 (1997).
66. A "quality indicator" is a statistic that may indicate the quality of care provided by a facility. For
example, a facility with a high percentage of bed sores or urinary catheters likely is not providing good care. See
for example the Center for Health Systems Research and Analysis, University of Wisconsin, Nursing Facility
Quality Indicator Definitions (1997). Information from the CHSRA is available on the Internet at
<www.chsra.wisc.edu>.
67. ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 64, § 13.6.4.1; see also Edelman, supra note 64, at 4 (questionable
validity of customer satisfaction surveys in nursing facilities).
68. ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 64, § 13.6.4.1; see also CARLSON, supra note 11, § 2.26[2] (statement
of deficiencies under federal law).
69. ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 64, § 13.6.4.1.
70. Certain provisions of federal Medicaid law can be waived by HCFA. These waivers commonly are
termed "Section 1115" waivers, because they are authorized by section 1115 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C.A. § 1315).
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Operations Manual and pertinent regulation. '71 Nonetheless, the HCFA declared
itself "eager to work with the State in the development of special studies and
experiments which could be conducted concurrently with the existing survey and
enforcement system.' 72 The HCFA specifically indicated that it was exploring
parameters for studies involving quality indicators and customer satisfaction
surveys, with the ultimate goal of augmenting the enforcement process and
providing information to individual nursing facilities.73
Recently, the HCFA began integrating use of quality indicators in the existing
enforcement system. In addition, the HCFA has taken steps to disseminate
information on recommended facility practices, most notably through a "Sharing
Innovations in Quality" posting on the Internet.74
Regardless of these HCFA actions, nursing facility trade associations have not
lessened their calls for an even more "cooperative" relationship with government
enforcement agencies. For example, the 1999 legislative platform of the California
Association of Health Facilities (CAHF) repeated in many ways the proposals of
the SDQI: use of "quality measurements" and customer satisfaction surveys, and
a focus on "prevention" rather than "punishment." 75 The CAHF at one point was
able to insert this language into 1999 nursing home reform legislation sponsored by
resident advocates, 76 although the resident advocates were able to delete or
moderate the CAIHF-sponsored language in the version of the legislation that
eventually passed the California Legislature.
77
B. Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Federal Enforcement
In another effort to alter the current model of federal oversight, in 1996 nursing
facility representatives arranged for a requirement that the Health Care Financing
Administration conduct "a study concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness
of the current mechanisms for surveying and certifying skilled nursing facilities for
compliance with the conditions and requirements of [federal law]., 78 Most
significantly, the study was required to include "a specific framework, where
appropriate, for implementing a process under which facilities... may be deemed
to meet applicable [M]edicare conditions and requirements if they are accredited
71. Letter from Bruce C. Viadeck, HCFA Administrator, to Joan Bachman, Administrator of the Office
of Health Care Facilities Licensure and Certification, South Dakota Dept. of Health (June 20, 1997) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. SharingInnovations inQuality(visitedFeb. 13,2000)<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/qualhmpg.htm>.
75. CAHF HELP, supra note 56, at 5.
76. AB 1160 (Cal. 1999) (as amended on Aug. 17, 1999, but not enacted).
77. AB 1160 (Cal. 1999) (as amended on Sept. 2, 1999, but not enacted).
78. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 516(d)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
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by a national accreditation body."79 In other words, HCFA was mandated to
consider the virtual replacement of the federal inspection and certification process
with the inspection by a private entity such as the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.80
Ultimately, the push for private accreditation foundered in July 1998 upon the
release of the Congressionally-mandated study.1 The study noted that private
accreditation of hospitals has been accepted as a substitute for government
inspection since 1965,82 but found that similar "deemed" status for nursing facilities
would not necessarily provide residents with adequate protection, in part because
nursing facility residents are relatively "more vulnerable, dependent and mentally
compromised.
' 83
The study noted that the nursing facility standards of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) are, in several respects, more
abstract than, and inferior to, the standards set by existing federal law. In general,
the JCAHO standards focus more on facility process than on resident outcomes.8
4
Unlike some of the federal standards, the JCAHO standards do not use specific
numbers (primarily temperatures and weights) to judge a facility's compliance or
noncompliance.8 In addition, the JCAHO standards place less emphasis on resident
rights: whereas the federal standards protect a resident's decision-making authority,
JCAHO's resident rights focus on the facility's level of performance, e.g., a right
to considerate care.
8 6
The study also found that the JCAHO survey process (as opposed to the
substantive standards) is inferior to the HCFA survey process in certain aspects.
Most significantly, JCAHO surveyors may pay relatively little attention to the care
actually provided to residents, whereas the federal survey process calls for
surveyors to spend a significant portion of time both observing care provided to
residents and interviewing residents regarding the care provided.87 A JCAHO
survey uses interviews with staff members as the primary means of gathering
information, 88 consistent with the JCAHO philosophy that the facility is the
79. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 516(d)(2), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
80. Similarly, the California Association of Health Facilities in 1997 sponsored legislation that would have
required the State of California to test on a limited basis the replacement of the existing enforcement system with
private accreditation. AB 1087 (Cal. 1997) (as introduced on Feb. 27, 1997, but not enacted).
81. See generally ABT ASSOCtATEs, supra note 64; Pear, supra note 41.
82. ABTASSoCiATEs, supra note 64, § 3.2; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395bb (West Supp. 1999).
83. ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 64, § 2.7.1.
84. Id. §§ 5.4.1, 5.5.
85. Id.§ 5.5.
86. Id. §§ 5.4.3.1, 5.5.
87. Id. §§ 7.2.1.3, 7.3.
88. Id. §§ 7.2.1.1, 7.2.2.
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customer.89 By contrast, a HCFA survey tends to evaluate a facility based on
residents' well-being, consistent with a philosophy of the resident as the customer.90
The differences between JCAHO surveys and HCFA surveys manifested
themselves in varying survey results. In forty-six percent of the sampled facilities
(each of which received both a JCAHO survey and a HCFA survey), the JCAHO
survey missed violations that were found by the HCFA survey to create a non-
isolated potential for more than minimal harm.9' Furthermore, in seven percent of
the sampled facilities, the JCAHO survey missed violations that, in the eyes of the
HCFA survey, caused harm to residents. 92 In two instances, the JCAHO survey
awarded an Accreditation with Commendation, a recognition of supposedly
excellent care, to a facility found by the HCFA to be harm-causing.93
For these reasons and others, the HCFA announced, concurrent with the release
of the study, that it would "not allow private accreditation agencies to substitute for
state reviews of nursing [facilities]."' As Health and Human Services Secretary
Donna Shalala put it, "[The private accreditation agencies] miss too much."'95 This
announcement halted the push by nursing facility representatives for deemed status
on the federal level.
C. Assisted Living
1. A More Favorable Image
In perhaps the purest example of the long-term care industry's push for
regulatory flexibility or leniency, long-term care providers have introduced an
"assisted living" model in which the relationship between a residential care
facility96 and a resident is determined primarily through contract. In the abstract, the
assisted living model allows the facility to provide carefully individualized care to
its residents. However, this model also releases facilities from government
oversight to a certain extent.97
89. Id.§ 7.3.
90. Id. § 7.3.
91. Id. §§ 8.4.2.2.2, 8.4.2.2.3, 8.5.3.
92. Id. §§ 8.4.2.2.4, 8.5.3.
93. Id. § 8.5.3.
94. Pear, supra note 41, at A14 (statement of Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services).
95. Worth Repeating, McKNIGHT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Sept. 1998, at 89.
96. This article uses the term "residential care facility" to refer generically to those facilities that provide
care and supervision to residents, but are not nursing facilities, and thus are not subject to federal nursing facility
law. Because residential care facilities are defined by state law, there is variation from state to state on the precise
term used to refer to a "residential care facility." These terms include "personal care home," "assisted living
facility," and "residential care facility for the elderly." See CARLSON, supra note 11, §§ 5.02[1], 5.10.
97. See, e.g., ASSISTED LIVING QUALITY COALITION, ASSISTED LIVING QUALITY INITIATIVE: BUILDING A
STRUCTURE THAT PROMOTES QUALITY, 63-85 (1998) [hereinafter ASSISTED LIVING INITIATIVE] (Guidelines to
States on Setting Minimum Standards for Providers of Assisted Living). The Assisted Living Quality Coalition
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The assisted living model is an unqualified hit in the court of public opinion.
What's not to like about assisted living's typical image-a home-like environment,
with assistance provided in exactly the amount to be adequate but not intrusive?
Consider, and compare to the standard images of a nursing facility, the definition
of assisted living produced by the National Center for Assisted Living, a trade
association affiliate of the American Health Care Association:
An assisted living setting is: [a] congregate residential setting that provides
or coordinates personal services, 24-hour supervision and assistance
(scheduled and unscheduled), activities, and health-related services;
[d]esigned to minimize the need to move; [d]esigned to maximize
residents' dignity, autonomy, privacy, independence, choice and safety; and
[d]esigned to encourage family and community involvement."
To date, the general public has not looked behind the superficial image of
assisted living. The general-interest news media has discussed assisted living from
a largely uncritical perspective, in a tone dramatically different from that used to
discuss nursing facilities.
Two articles from Time magazine illustrate the differing tones. First, in an
article representative of much of the nursing facility coverage, a 1997 Time article
reports in its subheading that "[i]n possibly thousands of cases, nursing-home
residents are dying from a lack of food and water and the most basic level of
hygiene." 99 The article opens with a description of a "dungeon" of a nursing facility
where bedpans are washed in the whirlpool bath and facility employees ignore
screaming residents.I°° The article closes with the story of a resident with a maggot-
infested bedsore, with a quote suggesting that the California Department of Health
Services approves the use of maggots for debridement of bed sores.' I
By contrast, a 1999 article from the same magazine opens a discussion of
assisted living'02 with the story of an eighty-two year-old woman who moved to "a
landscaped complex where about two dozen seniors live in their own apartments
and have round-the-clock staff members to help with daily tasks such as dressing
consists of representatives of the Alzheimer's Association, the American Association of Homes and Services for
the Aging, the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Center for Assisted Living (part of the
American Health Care Association), the American Seniors Housing Association, and the Assisted Living
Federation of America.
98. NATIONAL CENTER FOR ASSISTED LIVING, KEY CONCEFIS OF ASSISTED LIVING, 1 (1998).
99. Mark Thompson, Fatal Neglect, TIME, Oct. 27, 1997, at 34.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 38.
102. The subheading to the article states: "[n]ursing homes used to be the only stop for seniors who need
help. Now there are options." The article discusses assisted living facilities and (to a lesser extent) continuing care
retirement communities. John Greenwald, Elder Care: Making the Right Choice, TIME, August 30, 1999, at 52;
see CARLSON, supra note 11, ch. 6 (continuing care retirement communities).
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and bathing." 3 Later pages feature photographs of residents baking, gardening, and
exercising in pools, along with a photograph of a call-button pendant that evidently
provides quick access to assistance." 4
Only in the last few paragraphs does the article acknowledge that an assisted
living model may have some limitations. First, the article reports that assisted living
is expensive, and that assisted living expenses, in general, are not covered under
either the Medicare or Medicaid Programs.' 5 Then, in the final three paragraphs,
the article suggests that "[tihe boomtown growth of the assisted-living industry has
left it a bit rough around the edges."' 6 Quoting U.S. Senator John Breaux, the
article notes that a "bottom-line mentality can lead to consumer fraud and abuse"
in the assisted living industry; but responds with a sanguine paragraph that assumes
uncritically that assisted living is part of an "evolution" towards improvement in
long-term care:
Late-century American life is a social experiment in which we hope that
market institutions can be fashioned to meet the most personal
requirements. And sometimes they can be. New living arrangements for the
elderly are still evolving. If that evolution isn't finished in time for all our
parents to take advantage of, for many of us there will be a second
chance-when it's our turn.107
2. The Lack of Connection Between the Assisted Living Model and
Purported Advantages
It should not be surprising that, as reported in the Time article, an expensive
assisted living facility is able to provide pleasant living arrangements for
individuals with relatively limited medical problems."' 8 But assisted living
proponents claim a much broader advantage for the assisted living model:
specifically, that an assisted living model will produce a higher quality of long-term
care generally, regardless of residents' financial status or medical condition.1°9
103. Greenwald, supra note 102, at 52; see also Sara Rimer, A Helping Home: A Niche for the Elderly, and
for the Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at I (article opening with itory of 87 year-old woman moving into
assisted living facility, and "getting used to it").
104. Greenwald, supra note 102, at 54-55.
105. Id. at 56. Under limited circumstances, in some states, the Medicaid Program will pay for services (but
not for room and board) provided by an assisted living facility. See CARLSON, supra note 11, § 5.05[2][b].
106. Greenwald, supra note 102, at 56.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., John O'Connor, Look Who'sAsking Fora Handout, MCKNiGHT's LONG.TERM CARENEWS,
Dec. 1998, at 42 ("So far the [assisted living] industry has generally cherry-picked where it will operate and who
it will serve. And like many boutique businesses, it has generally shown little interest in customers who are unable
to pay from their own pockets.'); Rimer, supra note 103, at I (University of Minnesota gerontologist "concerned
that [assisted living facilities] will cater to the worried rich").
109. AssISTED LIVING INITIATVE, supra note 97, at 33-58.
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Among other things, the assisted living model will liberate long-term care providers
from the nursing facility laws that allegedly have prevented them from addressing
consumers' needs and desires." °
The proponents' claim may not stand up to scrutiny" Recall the definition of
assisted living-in brief, a setting or facility that provides necessary services,
minimizes the need to move, maximizes a resident's autonomy and privacy, and
encourages family and community involvement." 2 Many of these criteria could be
met by a well-run nursing facility. Specifically, although the nursing facility model
concededly does not "minimize the need to move"-because nursing facilities are
designed only for individuals with a certain minimum level of medical need-a
nursing facility could, and should, provide necessary services while maintaining a
resident's quality of life.'
1 3
Indeed, federal law already requires nursing facilities to meet most of the
criteria set by the assisted living definition. Under federal law, a nursing facility
must provide the dare and services that a resident needs to "attain or maintain the
highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being," including but
not limited to therapy services and assistance with daily necessities." 4 A nursing
facility also must protect the resident's privacy" 5 The nursing facility must allow
visits by family members and others,'1 6 and formation by family members of a
family council."
7
The claimed advantages of an assisted living model simply are not explained
by the legal differences between an assisted living model and a nursing facility
110. See, e.g., Congressional Auditors Warn Assisted Living Operators, McKNIGHT's LONG-TERM CARE
NEws, June 1999, at 24 (assisted living operator arguing that "[w]e know too well that many problems and
conflicts in the federal and state regulation of nursing homes. It would be a mistake to burden assisted living with
a similar system that doesn't work."); Kenneth L. Burgess, Proposed California Legislation Portends Troubling
National Trend for Assisted Living Providers, FOLEY & LARDNER LONG TERM CARE FORECAST, April 1999, at
2 ("Many long-term observers of the nursing home industry would argue that it is, in part, the prescriptive
regulations which have been visited upon the nursing home industry that have led to the 'cooking[sic]-cutter'
approach to physical plan design and service offerings for which nursing homes are so harshly criticized").
111. See, e.g., David Stires, The Gray Charade, SMARrMoNEY, Nov. 1999, at 138 ("Assisted living has
become the hottest trend in senior housing. It may be built on a myth").
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113. For example, the Eden Alternative and the Nursing Home Pioneer Movement each focus on improving
nursing facility care by improving interpersonal relationships between and among residents, facility employees,
and facility management. See Eden Alternative, (visited Feb. 13,2000) <http://www.edenalt.com>; see also Show
Tme, CONTEMP. LONG TERM CARE, Oct. 1999, at 21 (convention of Nursing Home Pioneers); NATIONAL
CITIZENS' COALITION FORNURSING HoMEREFORM, 1998Annual Meeting: Opening Session Highlights "Pioneer
Movement," QUALITY CARE ADVOCATE 1 (Jan. 1999).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2), (4)(A)(i), 1396r(b)(2), (4)(A)(i); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.25,483.45(a) (2000);
CARLSON, supra note 11, §§ 2.02[3], 2.10 (1999).
115. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(e) (2000).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(c)(3), 1396r(c)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(j) (2000); CARLSON, supra note 11,
§ 2.21 (2000).
117. 42U.S.C.A.§§1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(vii), 1396r(c)(1)(A)(vii);42C.F.R. §483.15(c)(2) (2000); CARLSON,
supra note 11, § 2.24 (1999).
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model. In fact, the distinguishing legal features of the assisted living model-less
stringent regulation, and more reliance on voluntary industry
standardst" 8 -contradict the many studies and reports that bemoan the leniency of
current enforcement of nursing facility standards. 1 9 The case for an assisted living
model is also not easily reconciled with HCFA's well-reasoned rejection of the
South Dakota Quality Initiative, t20 or HCFA's similarly well-reasoned refusal to
allow private accreditation to replace government enforcement.12 1 Resident
advocates are justifiably "concerned that assisted living may become a code word
for unregulated nursing homes or unregulated board and care homes with lax
standards, bad outcomes, and consumer fraud."'2
3. The Inability of Negotiated Contracts to Assure Adequate Quality of Care
Furthermore, the use of negotiated contracts in the assisted living model cannot
substitute for adequate government regulation and oversight. Proponents of assisted
living assume that market forces will guarantee an adequate quality of care.'23 This
argument ignores the fact that similar market forces assuredly have been
insufficient to create high standards in the nursing facility industry.
The reliance on contracts is particularly suspect given the unfamiliarity of most
consumers with long-term care, and the long-standing use by nursing facilities of
illegal and deceptive contracts.12 For example, a recent study of California nursing
facility admission agreements found, among other things, that 91.9% of the
118. See, e.g., ASSISTED LIVING INITIATIVE, supra note 97, at 40-51.
119. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS
NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALrIY STANDARDS (1999) (finding poor enforcement
of federal law); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT, (1998) (same); NATIONAL STATE AUDITORS
ASSOCIATION, JOINT PERFORMANCE AUDIT: LONG-TERM CARE 9-15 (1998) (finding poor enforcement of state
law); WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION: NURSING HOME REGULATION REPORT 98-2
(1998) (same).
120. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
121. See supra Part V.B.
122. ROSALIE KANE& KEREN BROWN WILSON, AMERICAN ASS'NOFREI'IRED PERSONS, ASSISTED LIVING
IN THE UNITED STATES: A NEw PARADIGM FOR RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR FRAIL OLDER PERSONS? 1 (1993).
123. See, e.g., ROBERT L. MOLLICA AND KIMBERLY IRVIN SNOW, STATE ASSISTED LIVING POLICY: 1996
xi (1996) (state setting minimal standards, assuming that market forces will produce an adequate quality of care);
Marshall Kapp, Enhancing Autonomy and Choice in Selecting and Directling Long-Term Care Services, 4 ELDER
LJ. 55, 93 (1996) ("iTihe marketplace acting through client purchasing decisions best safeguards the client.");
see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (concluding paragraph from 7Tme magazine article on assisted
living); Clarke, supra note 57, at 20 (vice president for nursing facility chain advocating use of admission
contracts to define "responsibilities and expectations" in nursing facilities, to avoid "inconsistency and
subjectivity of the current survey system" ).
124. See, e.g,, REBECCA J. BENSON, CHECK YOUR RIGHTS AT THE DOOR: CONSUMER PROTECTION
VIOLATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS NURSING HOME ADMISSION AGREEMENTS (1997); Charles Sabatino, Nursing
Home Admission: Contracts Undermining Rights the Old-Fashioned Way, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 553 (1990);
Patricia Nemore, Illegal Terms in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1165 (1985).
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agreements listed an illegal justification for the resident's eviction, 78.5% illegally
limited the facility's liability for an injury suffered by the resident, and 40.0%
illegally restricted the visiting hours of the resident's family.I12
Indeed, assisted living contracts in practice do not support the idealistic claims
of assisted living proponents. The General Accounting Office made a pessimistic
evaluation of the status quo:
A recent limited survey of industry practices noted that contracts had no
standard format, varied in detail and usefulness, and in some cases were
vague and confusing. For example, none of the contracts examined
mentioned how often services would be provided; a number of contracts
stated only that services would be provided as the facility deemed
appropriate. Furthermore, few specified what would occur if a resident's
health status declined, such as what needed additional services would be
provided, whether there are additional charges for these services, or
whether the resident would be asked to leave because needed services
could not be furnished.
126
Certainly contracts are not truly "negotiated," as shown by the fact that
facilities use standard, pre-printed contracts. Worse yet, residents may not even see
these contracts before making the decision to seek admission; according to another
GAO report, only twenty-five percent of facilities provided copies of contracts to
individuals considering admission.127
Finally, assisted living contracts-like nursing facility admission
agreements-may contain provisions that are illegal and/or unfair to residents. For
example, many assisted living proponents assume that "negotiated risk" provisions
of a contract would exempt the facility from legal liability for certain types of
injury suffered by the resident.
128
125. ERIC M. CARLSON, "IF ONLY I HAD KNOWN": MISREPRESENTATIONS BY NURSING HOMES WHICH
DEPRIVE RESIDENTS OFLEGAL PROTECTION 5-6, 11-13, 17-18,29 (1998).
126. GENERALACCOUNTINGOFFICE,GAOIHEHS-97-93,LONG-TER CARE: CONSUMERPROTEC IONAND
QUALITY-OF-CARE ISSUES IN ASSISTED LIVING, 6 (1997).
127. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-27, ASSISTED LIVING: QUALITY-OF-CARE AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES IN FOUR STATES, 15 (1999).
128. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHEHS-97-93, LONG-TERM CARE: CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND QUALITY-OF-CARE ISSUES IN ASSISTED LIVING, 6 (1997); KATHERINE BLANCHETrE, AARP, 3
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATE LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEMS, SUPPORTIVE HOUSING 19 (1997). But see JOSEPH L.
BIANCULLI, AMERICAN ASS'N OF HOMES AND SERVICES FOR THE AGING, NEGOTIATED RISK IN ASSISTED LIVING
1 (1996) (no waivers of liability in negotiated risk).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The nursing facility industry, as a whole, has a longstanding history of
providing substandard care.' 29 Nonetheless, nursing facilities do not deserve quite
the level of hostility that they receive in the news media and society. Yes, the
reported horror stories are true and, yes, many facilities provide a shockingly
deficient level of care, but among the nation's over 17,000 facilities' 30 are facilities
with sincere management and committed, professional employees.
Ironically, nursing facility trade associations, although commissioned with the
task of improving facilities' public image, bear significant responsibility for the
continued poor performance of the nursing facility industry, and for the scathing
reports and hostile press coverage that are the unavoidable progeny of substandard
care. Although industry representatives claim publicly that they favor tough action
against "bad apple" facilities,' 3' the representatives' lobbying and litigation have
created a federal enforcement system that is virtually incapable of bringing "bad
apples" into compliance.
3 2
Furthermore, by reflexively blaming government for the industry's own
shortcomings, industry representatives have fostered a persecution complex that
impedes progress at all levels. At a macro level, as discussed above, facilities'
defensive attitudes and policies have hamstrung enforcement. At a micro
level-relating to the care of individual residents-these same defensive attitudes
cause facility operators to cut corners, deny services and, in general, treat residents
and residents' family members as potential adversaries rather than valued
customers. These attitudes and actions only confirm the public's general sense that
the operation of a nursing facility is a distasteful and disreputable business.'
129. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST
DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT, Report No. GAO/HEHS-98-202(1998); IOM REPORT, supra note 12,
at 3 (1986) (history ofpoorcare provided by nursing facilities); BRUCEVLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THENURSING
HOME TRAGEDY 4-5 (1980) (same); McKnight Providers, supra note 51, at 24 (Urban Institute analyst seeing
current problems "as a continuation of an ongoing saga that has plagued the nursing home industry for 30 years
or longer").
130. AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, FACTS AND TRENDS: THE NURSING FACILITY SOURCEBOOK
1999, at 28 (1999).
131. See, e.g., 3lankenheim, supra note 61, at 26 (president of American Association of Homes and Services
for the Aging declaring support for "any reasonable plan that drives the chronically poor performers out of the
nursing home business"); How to Assess the GAO Report?, MCKNIGHT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Sept. 1998,
at 89 (vice president of American Health Care Association claiming "zero-tolerance policy" for abuse and neglect
of elderly).
132. See McKnight Providers, supra note 51, at 24 (Urban Institute analyst stating that "the emphasis on
plans of correction rather than more rigid oversight has 'institutionalized a mediocre quality of care' across the
board and failed to root out chronic offenders").
133. See, e.g., John O'Connor, The Sky's Not the Problem, McKNIGHT's LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, Mar.
1999, at 39 ("In some ways, the industry seems to be afflicted with a Chicken Little mentality .... For providers,
blaming current problems on the government, the media or other handy external forces may be good for venting,
but little else."); Providers Cite Image as Industry's Biggest Challenge, McKNIGHT's LONG-TERM CARE NEWS,
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Thus, the long-term care industry needs a change of attitude. On the policy
level, trade associations must recognize the need for effective enforcement of the
nursing facility law, and for meaningful government standards for assisted living
facilities. Individual facilities must put aside their defensive attitudes and focus
their energies on providing a superior level of service.
Similar recommendations were recently made by Paul Willging, executive vice
president of the American Health Care Association for fifteen years, who has been
perhaps the principal spokesman for the nursing facility industry in recent years.
Unfortunately, Mr. Willging made these remarks only after resigning from AHCA
and taking a position in academia.'
34
Ideally, Mr. Willging's successors will confront the problems in the long-term
care industry before their resignations, and will take active steps to improve the
quality of care provided by the nation's long-term care facilities. Absent such a
significant change of attitude, long-term care facilities are likely to face increasing
levels of enforcement actions and litigation, and will continue to be seen as the
haunted mansions of our society.
Jan. 1999, at 16 (Urban Institute researcher stating: "I feel the [long-term care] industry vacillates between two
things: denying that there is a quality problem and blaming Medicare for not paying enough to rectify it.").
134. Willging: Providers Should Share Blame, MCKNIOHT'S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS, July 1999, at 10
("Nursing facilities are partly to blame for their low standing among the general public, and they will have to do
more to improve the quality of long-term care that is delivered. The statement is hardly unusual, until one
considers its source: Paul L Willging, Ph.D. Willging had been the executive vice president of the 11,000-
member American Health Care Association for a decade and a half, until he resigned earlier this year.").

